I'm going to skip around in this writing, just hitting some of the highlights that attracted my attention in the last chapter.
I don't remember much of what I'm reading in Hew Strachan's The First World War (I don't even understand much of it, not having any background in WWI history.), but some things stand out as I'm reading them. One of those things comes in the form of a chapter headline: Jihad. It is a topic that makes sensational headlines in 2019, let alone a hundred years in our past. The chapter begins with this:
I don't remember much of what I'm reading in Hew Strachan's The First World War (I don't even understand much of it, not having any background in WWI history.), but some things stand out as I'm reading them. One of those things comes in the form of a chapter headline: Jihad. It is a topic that makes sensational headlines in 2019, let alone a hundred years in our past. The chapter begins with this:
 | In Constantinople, capital of the Ottoman Empire, the Sheikh-ul-Islam declared an Islamic holy war against Britain, France, Russian, Serbia, and Montenegro on 14 November 1914. He spoke on behalf of the Caliphate, a combination of spiritual and temporal authority claimed by the Sultan, and justified by the fact that the holy cities of Mecca and Medina fell within the purlieus of his rule. But the reach of the Ottoman Empire, which at its height in the sixteenth century had extended from the Persian Gulf to Poland, and from Cairo to the gates of Vienna, was contracting. In 1914, of 270 million Muslims in the world in 1914 [sic], only about 30 million were under French rule, most of them in North and Equatorial Africa; and another 20 million were incorporated in Russia's Asian empire. Those Muslims in the British, French and Russian empires who opposed the Ottoman Empire's summons to holy war were promised 'the fire of hell'. The Muslims in Serbia and Montenegro, who were likely to commit the lesser offence of fighting Austria-Hungary, would merit only 'painful torment'. |
While the chapter tells more about the Ottoman Empire and the "holy war", Strachan seems to focus more on the movements within the war at this point than the religious dogmas that drove this portion of the war. The next tidbit comes from the same chapter, but demonstrates the Empire's bargaining value. Not only does this display the desires of nations and militaries, but it better demonstrates how complicated the thought processes and strategies can be when war is concerned.
Moltke's problem was that the German army and German weapons were all fully committed to the war in Europe. He had no rifles he could send to those who might rise against British, French or Russian rule, and certainly no troops. And, even if he had them, British naval supremacy meant that he could not send them by sea. The Ottoman Empire could confer two strategic benefits on Germany: its army could provide the troops for overseas deployment and its land mass could open the overland routes to Central Asia and Africa.
At the same time, cultural differences are hardly understood. I've recently read about the Indian practice of kidnapping/adopting members of the enemy or innocent bystanders during the French and Indian War in the 1750s, but something similar happened among the Turks. In the case of the Indians, the desire was to maintain numbers and keep the tribal population up; in the case of the Turks, desires may have been more carnal in nature.
...The American consul in Erzurum, Leslie Davis, reported from Kharput, the principal transit point, in July that 'The Turks have already chosen the most pretty from among the children and young girls. They will serve as slaves, if they do not serve ends that are more vile'. He was struck by how few men he could see, and concluded that they had been killed on the road. Many thousands of Armenians also succumbed to famine and disease. Mortality among the 200,000 to 300,000 who fled to the comparative safety of Russia rose to perhaps 50 per cent, thanks to cholera, dysentery and typhus...
With all of the competition for allies and territory, big things were also happening in health. Not only in the diseases from that last clip, but also in hardships produced by extreme climate and landforms. These struggles of a new battlefield were difficult for soldiers who were not used to them. In this, I am also reminded of the difficulties the British and the French had in understanding the terrain of the Lake George/Lake Champlain area, where they had to learn to use the terrain for strategy and advantage rather than sit back and lament their situation.
...The differences from the western front were were the products of the terrain and the climate. The narrow and steep foothold on the shore meant that the positions had little depth, and that the only relief was to go for a swim in the sea. But the heat that made that an attractive option also brought flies and then disease, particularly dysentery; water supplies were a constant headache. Only 30 per cent of British casualties in the campaign were sustained in battle.
Again, these thoughts are just the ones that came to me upon the reading of the chapter. They may be a bit disjointed in my reflection here, but they are a beginning on a journey of understanding more about WWI. As I continue to read about two wars - the French and Indian War and World War I - I hope to build on the foundations that are beginning to form in my mind.
I am reading this book to prepare for my week-long teacher institution at Fort Ticonderoga in upstate New York,
this summer. Follow the link to my Fort Ticonderoga page for more.
this summer. Follow the link to my Fort Ticonderoga page for more.
